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Abstract
Experimental studies model corruption as reciprocal behavior that generates negative 
externalities for third parties. Results on how negative externalities factor in individu-
als’ corruption-related decisions have been mixed. While (imputed) intentions have been 
proven to have an impact on participants’ social preferences and kindness evaluations in a 
wide array of situations, little is known about whether and how the (imputed) intentions 
of third parties may enter participants’ deliberation in corruption contexts. The assumed 
differential evaluation of externalities according to whether they are borne by active players 
or dummy players has important implications for real-life corruption. In many instances 
of corruption negative externalities are indeed incurred by (sets of) ‘dummy players’, such 
as ‘society at large’. In other cases, however, more active players (such as the political head 
of a governmental department) are the target of negative externalities. Reciprocity models 
would predict that kindness evaluations concerning third parties would enter the consid-
erations of partners to the corrupt transaction in the latter but not the former case. This 
important prediction, however, has not been empirically tested. We find that intentions of 
third parties do not affect behavior, but affect how kind individuals are perceived by others.
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Resumen. Corrupción y externalidades: evaluar el papel de las intenciones
Los estudios experimentales modelan la corrupción como una forma de comportamiento 
establecido sobre la base de relaciones de reciprocidad que genera externalidades negativas 
para terceros. Los resultados acerca de cómo las externalidades negativas influyen en las 
decisiones relacionadas con la corrupción de los individuos no son concluyentes. Si bien 
se ha demostrado que las intenciones (imputadas) tienen un impacto en las preferen-
cias sociales y las evaluaciones de amabilidad de los participantes en una amplia gama de 
situaciones, poco se sabe si los participantes toman en consideración y de qué manera las 
intenciones (imputadas) de terceros en contextos de corrupción. La supuesta diferencia al 
evaluar las externalidades en función de si afectan a jugadores activos o a jugadores pasivos 
tiene implicaciones importantes para la corrupción en la vida real. En muchos casos de 
corrupción, las externalidades negativas afectan a (conjuntos de) «jugadores pasivos», como 
«la sociedad en general». En otros casos, sin embargo, jugadores más activos (como el jefe 
político de un departamento gubernamental) son objeto de externalidades negativas. Los 
modelos de reciprocidad predicen que las evaluaciones de amabilidad respecto a los terceros 
que son objeto de externalidades negativas entrarían en las consideraciones de las partes en 
una transacción corrupta en el último caso, pero no cuando se trata de jugadores pasivos. 
Esta importante predicción, sin embargo, no ha sido empíricamente probada. Encontramos 
que las intenciones de terceros no afectan al comportamiento directamente sino que afectan 
a la forma en que se percibe la amabilidad de los demás.
Palabras clave: corrupción; externalidades; reciprocidad; intenciones; experimento
1. Introduction
There is a vast literature in sociology and economics that addresses socially 
beneficial aspects of cooperation (Ostrom et al., 1994; Kollock, 1998; Fehr and 
Gächter, 2000). However, much less has been explored about how cooperation 
unfolds when it entails negative externalities to third parties. In a broad array of 
situations, people benefit at the expense of others (market transactions, sports, 
access to grants, etc.). In those contexts, however, harm to others may be more 
or less tolerable, depending on the prevailing norms.
Corruption affords an example in which cooperation between corrupt par-
ties generally harms unidentified and passive others (see Abbink et al., 2002; 
also Weisel and Shalvi, 2015). In many situations those harmed by corrupt 
people have previously deposited their trust in them, that is, they have placed 
themselves, or their time, resources and confidence at the expense of others. 
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These kinds of situations are recurrent in the political arena. Union workers 
may vote for a delegate who instead of supporting a strike to protect the inter-
ests of fellow worker members may unilaterally collude with the employer and 
back up his/her interests, thus undermining support for the strike. Similar 
examples may involve governments who decide to spend money on procure-
ment with officials and businesspeople having the opportunity to collude. Or 
it might be voters in a referendum who grant more power to the executive at 
the risk of subsequent collusion with lobby groups.
These types of situations exemplify the well-known definition of corruption 
as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Transparency International, 
2012). In order to capture the features of these situations, we propose a three-
player bribery game in which two players can act corruptly to increase their 
payoffs to the detriment of a third player. The game is sequential and has the 
following features: the first player may choose to trust, thereby increasing the 
payoffs of two other players at the risk of collusion between them. These two 
players enter in a coordination game after the first player’s trusting move, and 
may decide individually either to reciprocate the first player’s trusting move 
or collude to share the surplus while imposing a cost on the first mover. We 
compare this situation with a similar one in which the first player does not 
initiate the game, and therefore cannot generate any surplus, while she can still 
incur in the costs associated to coordination by the other two players.
A well-established result in the literature on corruption (see Abbink et 
al., 2002; Abbink, 2004; Barr and Serra 2009, Lambsdorff and Frank, 2010; 
Jacquemet, 2012), though not uncontested (see Gneezy et al., 2018), holds 
that reciprocity helps sustain collaboration in such collusive bribery settings. 
Consistent with intentions-based models, in corruption contexts reciprocity is 
found to be a function of the bribe amount passed by one party: higher bribes 
offered imply higher reciprocity levels. The supposed mechanism behind this 
is that people judge higher transfers relative to lower ones as kinder (Falk and 
Fischbacher, 2006). Therefore, higher transfers spur higher levels of reciprocal 
behavior. 
In line with this mechanism, most models of reciprocity predict that people 
would treat those who were kinder to them in the first place more kindly 
(Rabin, 1993; Levine, 1998; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2000; Falk and 
Fischbacher, 2006). Moreover, this implies that people are in general expected 
to be kinder to ‘active players’ (i.e., individuals whose actions directly affect 
one’s well-being) than to dummy players (i.e., individuals whose actions are 
immaterial for one’s well-being and who therefore cannot behave ‘kindly’; for 
a discussion of this topic see López-Perez, 2008). In experimental corruption 
games, negative externalities are generally imposed upon dummy players. For 
example, costs associated with corrupt collaboration are sometimes imple-
mented as a drastic decrease in the experimenters’ donation to an ONG (see 
Lambsdorff and Frank, 2010). 
Depending on whether they are borne by active players or dummy players, 
the assumed differential evaluation of externalities has important implications 
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for real-life corruption. In many instances of corruption negative externalities 
are indeed incurred by (sets of) ‘dummy players’, such as ‘society at large.’ In 
other cases, however, more active players (such as union workers voting for 
a delegate or citizens granting more power to the executive branch of gover-
nment in a referendum) are the target of negative externalities. Reciprocity 
models would predict that kindness evaluations concerning third parties would 
enter the considerations of the partners to the corrupt transaction in the latter 
but not the former case. This important prediction, however, has not been 
empirically tested. This paper tests the prediction that corrupt collaboration 
may be thwarted by reciprocity concerns towards the third party bearing the 
externalities, and that these reciprocity concerns are affected by whether the 
third party is an active player or a dummy. We contend that individuals’ sensi-
tivity to externalities may be mediated by the third party’s perceived intention. 
If participants have social preferences and give due weight to externalities, they 
will refrain from collaboration with the corrupt partner. The weight they assign 
to these externalities is hypothesized to depend on whether or not the third 
party is an active player, and if so, on her perceived kindness.
To empirically study whether intentions toward active and dummy third 
parties could hinder corruption, we exposed participants to a three player game 
in which the third party potentially suffering from the externalities caused by 
corruption is either a dummy player (and therefore can signal no intentions) or 
an active player (capable of signaling intentions). This allows us to investigate 
participants’ choices in our “bribery game”, and to assess whether the third 
party’s perceived intentions have an impact on reciprocal behavior between 
the briber and the player being bribed. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section 
we discuss the related experimental literature touching upon corruption in 
particular. Our experimental design is presented in section 2, followed by the 
behavioral predictions in section 3. In section 4 we present our data and results 
and discuss them. Section 5 concludes.
2. The study
The objective of the study was to assess whether the effect of externalities on 
a third party could prevent the establishment of corrupt relationships. The 
third party could have either a passive or an active role. As a consequence, 
to evaluate the differential impact of imputed intentions, beliefs about other 
players’ kindness were measured. 
2.1. Experimental design
2.1.1. No_trust treatment
Our experiment consists of two treatments: a No_trust treatment (NT hen-
ceforth) and a Trust treatment (TT henceforth). In the NT, Role A player 
is a passive player devoid of any strategic role, and therefore cannot actively 
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influence other players’ decisions. However, A is an actually participant pre-
sent in the room. Role B player decides between IN or OUT. If she chooses 
OUT, the game ends and each player payoffs’ are (20, 20, 20). If she chooses 
IN, she passes the play to C, who in turn has to choose between IN or OUT. 
If C selects OUT, then each player get 20 points, while if she selects IN, then 
player A gets 10, and the other players get 25 each (see Figure 1).
2.1.2. Trust treatment
Our TT differs from the NT in that Player A is an active player moving first 
in the sequence (see Figure 2). Player A has the option to opt out of the game 
(OUT), assuring for himself a payoff of 15 EMUs,1 or passing-the-play (IN) 
to player B, who could either a) share the surplus generated by A’s action 
choosing OUT, or b) pass the play to role C player. In the latter case, payoffs 
depend ultimately on C’s action. If C chooses OUT, she thereby rejects the 
corrupt transaction proposed by B, and this action generates the most equal 
outcome across all three players (20, 20, 20). Note that besides being the most 
equal, this outcome is a Pareto improvement compared to the sub-game perfect 
equilibrium. If B and C ‘cooperate in corruption’ (i.e., both choose IN), A is 
always worse-off, getting her minimum payoff in the game. This represents a 
negative externality for player A.
Note that in our set-up each individual has a ‘fair option’ in her strategy 
space. Therefore, there is a straightforward way to evaluate the kindness of 
any action by comparison with the available fair option, i.e., B and C players 
always have an available fair action (which is to choose OUT). For player A, 
option OUT is always better than IN, and therefore participants in role A 
would presumably judge the OUT choices of B and C as kinder. B and C, 
unlike A, would probably judge the IN choices rather than the OUT choices 
made by participants in other roles as kinder, since IN choices give them a 
higher payoff.
2.1.3. Procedure
We conducted the experiment at the Sociological Laboratory of the 
Department of Sociology at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands 
during December 2012 and early 2013. Subjects were invited from a database 
of approximately 1200 registered volunteer students from different fields using 
the ORSEE recruitment software (Greiner, 2015). The recruitment and the 
experiment complied with the ethical guidelines set out by the Sociological 
Laboratory (http://www.gmw.rug.nl/~orsee/public/privacy.php). In total, 10 
groups of 3 participated in the NT and 9 groups in the TT. We ran three 
sessions with 15 participants and one session with 12. Subjects participated in 
only one of the treatments. The experiment was programmed and conducted 
in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The average earnings were €10.66 per person 
1. Payoffs throughout the paper are expressed in EMUs (experimental monetary units) which were 
exchangeable for euros at the end of the session at the exchange rate of 1 euro for 50 EMUs.
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in the TT (€6.66 plus a €4 show up fee) and €12 in the NT (€8 plus a €4 
show up fee). Each session lasted about 45 minutes.
Upon arrival at the lab, participants were seated at different computer 
terminals. They were told that they would participate in a decision-making 
experiment and that communication would not be allowed during the study. 
Participants were further told that their earnings in the experiment would 
depend on their own choices and the choices of others. It was made clear that 
their choices would remain anonymous and that final cash payout at the end 
of the study would depend on how many points they had earned during the 
experiment. Before starting the experiment, the subjects were made aware that 
the experiment did not involve deception of any form.
Following an introduction by an assistant, participants were provided the 
instructions, which were completely programmed in z-Tree (see Appendix II 
for the TT and NT instructions). At the beginning of each round, the partici-
pants were randomly divided into groups of three (3) people. In each round, 
after the groups were formed, the computer randomly assigned an ID to each 
participant in a group. There were 3 IDs: Role A, Role B and Role C. These 
IDs were also reassigned in each round, so the same participant interacted in 
different roles (A, B or C) for 20 periods. Groups were randomly re-matched 
after every round, meaning that the participants were re-allocated to a different 
group after each round (random rematching).  The participants also knew 
(i.e., it was common knowledge) that each participant could be assigned to a 
different (or the same) role in each round and that she would be interacting 
within a newly formed triplet. This feature of the design was chosen in order 
to prevent participants’ decisions from being affected by the anticipation of 
possible future monetary gains.2For our specific research purposes, however, 
not allowing for reputation formation to influence trusting behavior permits 
us to avoid possible confounding explanations. Participants were fully infor-
med about all details of the procedure. In both treatments, participants were 
informed of all the decisions made in their group and the points earned by each 
member at the end of each period. We deliberately avoided using in-context 
terms in the instructions. Following standard practice in experimental econo-
mics, we used neutral language that avoided any reference to trust, cooperation 
and/or externalities.
Attributions of kindness were measured in each round by asking partici-
pants to rate the kindness of the other participants in her group (How unkind/
kind was Participant X to you?) on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 
2. For the sake of clarity, the design does not preclude the possibility that the same participants 
interact repeatedly over the rounds. The current design also allows for a less direct form of 
reputation building, or perhaps norm initiation. For instance, an A participant may choose 
IN in round 1 in the hopes that their B and C participants will be more likely to follow 
suit when they themselves play role A later on, indirectly benefitting the current A player 
in later rounds when she plays role B or C if she sees more play of IN by the new A player. 
However, this is an empirical matter and we found no evidence for this hypothesis. Quite 
on the contrary, players A became more distrustful over the rounds (see results section).
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1 = very unkind to 7 = very kind. This method is similar to the method used 
by Falk and Fischbacher (2006). Earnings were computed by summing up the 
points participants earned in each round at the end of the session, which were 
converted into cash at an exchange rate of €1 for 50 points.  After completing 
the task, the participants were debriefed and their earnings as well as their 
show-up fees were placed in envelopes, each of which was picked up privately 
to ensure they did not know what others had earned.
3. Behavioral predictions
The main purpose of the manipulation was to test whether differences between 
IN choices are the result of reciprocity concerns. The experimental set-up 
allows us to investigate A’s status (as an active or passive player) by compa-
ring the frequency of IN actions undertaken by role B and C players in the 
NT vis-a-vis the TT. In addition, by comparing kindness perceptions we can 
assess whether differences in choices might be the result of reciprocity-driven 
preferences. For instance, a higher level of OUT choices of participants in role 
B might be the result of positive reciprocity toward A. 
In each round, player A finds it in his/her interest to go OUT rather than 
passing the play to the other players, precisely because he/she knows that it will 
not be in the interest of the other players to reciprocate him/her by choosing 
OUT. In a model of selfish utility maximization, both B and C will choose 
to play IN, and thus corrupt transactions will always be struck between B and 
C to the detriment of the third party A. Both B and C are then better off if 
they cooperate with each other. But cooperation is clearly not a Pareto impro-
vement compared to when A chooses OUT, as A is worse off, even though B 
and C are better off. This feature of our set-up provides us with a backward 
induction argument to derive the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium for the 
TT. Paradoxical as it may seem, assuming that individuals are guided by their 
self-interest implies a prediction of zero-level corruption: the unique sub-game 
perfect equilibrium involves C and B playing IN and A playing OUT. The 
conclusion of this backward induction argument is that A should go OUT, 
which immediately brings the game to an end. 
This game-theoretical solution rests upon the assumption that individuals 
are solely motivated by their own payoffs and expect others to be so motivated 
as well. For this reason, it does not matter whether player A is an active or a 
passive player, or whether she can signal fair intentions. A money-maximizing 
B will always try to strike a corrupt deal by passing the play to C, while C will 
always choose the option that most favors both B and C. From the perspective 
of player A, the TT resembles a trust game. By trusting player B (and perhaps 
player C in the event B proves untrustworthy) through choosing IN, player 
A can potentially earn a higher payoff than she earns when choosing OUT. 
From experimental studies employing the trust game we know that despite the 
sub-game perfect equilibrium prediction of no trust placed, many first movers 
(players A in our game), choose to trust (IN in our game) (Berg et al., 1995; 
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McCabe et al., 2003).Let us call this phenomenon the Trust argument. There-
fore, we expect a non-negligible level of INchoices by role A players in the TT 
of our experiment. Hence, we expect a sufficient number of moves by player 
B in the TT to be able to compare the TT to the NT in terms of B’s behavior. 
The Trust argument provides us with a different argument, since we expect 
individuals to consider those who pass the play to be kinder than those who 
do not. More precisely, player A’s trusting behavior should be compensated 
since it enhances the surplus at a potential own cost. The presence of a Role 
A player as an active player should therefore impair, to some degree, the stri-
king of corrupt deals between B and C. Therefore, conditional on the Role A 
player having chosen IN (following kind behavior by A), we expect a lessening 
of corruption (of IN choices) in the TT, where the presence of a benevolent 
player A who can signal fair intentions should enhance the awareness of exter-
nalities, compared to the NT. We expect this effect to apply to both role B 
and role C players, and so we derive the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Role B and Role C players are less likely to choose IN in the TT 
than in the NT. 
However, since (when given the move) final payoffs hinge ultimately on 
role C’s action, we hypothesize that this feature of the decision-making process 
could induce an enhanced feeling of responsibility on the part of C (reversely, 
a diminished feeling of responsibility on the part of B).  Recent experimental 
literature shows that morals are malleable, and specific features of the environ-
ment, such as being pivotal for the outcomes, have a bearing on individuals’ 
choices (Falk and Szech, 2016). Pivotality also relates to the effect of dele-
gation. In a series of papers, for instance, it has been found that in Dictator 
Games, the delegation of an unfair decision helps to reduce the delegator’s 
responsibility (see Coffman, 2011; Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012). Bartling 
and Fischbacher (2012) found that dictators were less likely to be punished 
when they decided an unfair allocation through delegation rather than directly. 
According to these authors, delegation allows blame to be shifted, inducing a 
shifting of the locus of responsibility. This insight was also applied to the study 
of intermediaries in a bribery experiment (Drugov et al., 2014). Allegedly, by 
shifting the blame, delegation to an intermediary could reduce moral costs 
associated to bribery. Although in our game we do not include a measure of 
responsibility attribution, following the idea of this study, we can expect that 
players in role B will be more likely to choose IN than role C players since 
responsibility for final payoffs rests ultimately on C’s shoulders and B can 
interpret her own decision as a delegation to C. We thus derive the following 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Role C players are less likely to choose IN than role B players. 
Based on the above arguments regarding C’s responsibility for final payoffs, 
and considering the fact that in the TT, C’s pivotality might be more salient 
than it is in the NT, we also expect that:
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Hypothesis 3: Role C players are more likely to choose IN in the NT than in 
the TT.
Considering kindness attributions as stated by participants, we propose the 
following general hypothesis. Following the trust argument, the effect of A’s 
behavior on B’s behavior in the TT is mediated by B’s kindness evaluation of 
A’s action. Therefore, we pose the next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: In general we expect players to be more likely to choose OUT 
the kinder they find others.
4. Data and variables
The experiment comprised 4 sessions, with 5 triplets in three sessions, and 
4 triplets in the remaining one. Therefore, we obtained observations on 57 
subjects: 30 participants in the NT and 27 participants in the TT. Since each 
participant played 20 rounds alternating randomly between different roles, we 
had a total of 57 x 20 = 1140 observations. Note that in the TT, B could only 
make a decision if A chose IN. Similarly, C could only make a decision if both 
A and B chose IN. Thus, not every participant got the turn in each round, so 
the number of actual decisions amounts to 760. 
In order to test the hypotheses, we estimate B’s and C’s probabilities of 
choosing IN depending on the experimental treatment and the attributions 
of kindness. The dichotomous variable Action takes the value of 1 if the actor 
chooses IN and 0 otherwise. The variable Round was defined by centering 
the original rank numbers of the 20 rounds as Round = Round rank number 
– 10.5. So, the variable round ranges from -9.5 to 9.5. Intercepts can then 
be interpreted as the average number of units of IN decisions in the ‘average’ 
round.
4.1. Results 
Since we have a repeated measures design with a dichotomous dependent 
variable (i.e., the decisions to play IN or OUT), we used a multilevel logistic 
regression model to analyze the data. Multilevel modeling takes into account 
the hierarchical data structure (Snijders and Bosker, 2012) and allows the 
handling of data when observations are not stochastically independent. The 
experiment included 57 participants who each played 20 one-shot interactions, 
so that a total of 1140 observations (Level 1) were nested within 57 partici-
pants (Level 2). The experimental conditions are thus level-2 variables.
We use the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimation, since this 
procedure yields less biased estimates than standard approximate estimation 
techniques. In addition, MCMC estimation yields the deviance statistic, which 
allows us to use approximate likelihood ratio tests to compare nested statistical 
models. The difference in the deviance statistics of two nested models appro-
ximately follows a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to 
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the difference in the number of parameters of the models compared (see Hox, 
1995). Significant values indicate that the model with the lower deviance is 
an improvement over the model with the higher deviance.
4.2. Descriptive statistics
In the TT, role A players chose IN 53.3% of the time (see Figure 3). When 
given the turn, Role B players chose IN 82.8% of the time, while role C players 
made the INchoice 65.4 % of the time. 
Figure 1. Illustration of the game in extensive form of the TT
Source: Own elaboration.
Figure 2. Illustration of the game in extensive form of the NT
Source: Own elaboration.
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In the NT, the percentage of role B players choosing IN was 83.5%, while 
role C players chose IN 75.3% of the time. Note that the difference in beha-
vior between B and C is larger in the TT than in the NT.
As expected, the number of IN choices in the TT was far from negligible. 
Indeed, corrupt deals are struck at high levels, regardless of treatments. Moreo-
ver, the descriptive statistics go in the direction predicted by hypotheses1 and 
4, since role B and C players chose IN fewer times in the TT condition.  
Consistent with the descriptive statistics from graphical inspection of Figu-
re 3 we can infer that the frequency of C players choosing IN is lower than 
that of role B players. Although the figure might suggest otherwise, differences 
between treatments turned out to be non-significant for role C players.
4.3. Statistical analysis
Multilevel models were fitted using MLwiN software (Rasbash et al., 2009). 
Following standard practice empty models were fitted first, yielding measures 
of clustering in the data. Then we fitted random intercept models with fixed 
effects for the predictor variables. A fixed effect for Round-center was included 
in all models. As outcomes were binary, we used the logit function. 
We use the parameter estimates to evaluate the significance of individual 
coefficients. In this way, we can test the null hypothesis for a particular esti-
mated parameter using the Wald criterion, which states that an estimate is sig-
Figure 3. Frequency of IN choices plotted against Role and Treatment
Source: Own elaboration.
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nificantly different from zero at α = 0.05 if it exceeds 1.96 times its associated 
standard error (e.g., Hox, 1995). In other words, if the ratio of an estimated 
parameter over its standard error exceeds 1.96, then the H0 regarding that 
parameter is rejected. The parameter should then be included in an adequate 
model of the data.
4.4. Regression results
The level of corruption was measured taking as our dependent variable IN 
choices made by B and C. We have allowed the probability of choosing IN 
to vary across participants (random intercept), but we have assumed that the 
effects of the explanatory variables are the same for each participant.
The degree of clustering in the data can be summarized by the intra-class 
correlation coefficient (ICC) and the variance partition coefficient (VPC). The 
intra-class correlation is a measure of the dependency in the data at the same 
individual and can have a value in the interval [0, 1]. Normally the formula 
to calculate the ICC is ICC = Between Group Variance/(Between Group 
Variance + Within Group Variance) ().In this case the decision-level variance is 
standardized to the logistic variance of 𝜋2/3 ≈ 3.29.  In our study our between 
group variance is 4.2 (See Table 1). Thus ICC = 4.2/4.2 + 3.29 ≈ 0.56. In our 
model, since we have a binomial distribution, the ICC and VPC are identical 
and measure the within-subject expected correlation between observations. To 
put it another way, the ICC measures the proportion of total variance in the 
outcome variable that is explained by differences between individuals. Inter-
preted as VPC it represents the proportion of the variation in the propensity 
to choose IN that lies between subjects. The ICC is .56, which means that the 
expected correlation between two decisions by the same subject is .56. The 
value .56 signifies that propensity to choose IN varied greatly between indivi-
duals. Interpreted as VPC we would say that 56% of the variation in the pro-
bability to choose IN lies between subjects. This indicates that 56% of chances 
of choosing IN is explained by between subjects differences, which validates 
our approach using multilevel modeling (for more details on how to calculate 
the ICC see Leckie and Charlton, 2012; Sommet and Morselli, 2017).
4.4.1. Treatment effects
The core results of the experiment are summarized in Figure 3. To test hypoth-
eses 1 and 3, we inspect the coefficients for variable treatment in Model 3 (see 
Table 1), in which we added a level-2 variable for treatment (NT as reference 
category). According to hypotheses 1 and 3, we would have expected fewer 
IN choices by role B and C players in the TT than in the NT. In line with 
our core hypotheses, the descriptive statistics suggested that IN choices were 
slightly higher in the NT. However, adding the treatment variable did not 
improve the model fit (𝜋2 = 0.29, 𝜋(SE) = -0.373 (0.678), p > 0.59). Note that 
this result contradicts hypotheses 1 and 3. For role B and role C players there 
is no significant statistical treatment difference in the propensity to choose 
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IN. This means that we must reject a main hypothesized treatment difference, 
since players’ behavior was not affected by the presence of an active third party 
compared to a passive one. 
Hypothesis 2 states that Role C players are less likely to choose IN (than 
role B players) due to their role pivotality. It turned out that, in line with 
hypothesis 2, Role C players are significantly less likely than role B players to 
choose IN, regardless of treatment. Model 2 supports this result (see Table 1). 
To test whether C players were more likely to choose IN in the NT, we com-
pared the empty model with no predictors to the model with a dummy variable 
for role C (taking B as a reference category). The model with Role C signifi-
cantly improved the fit (χ2 = 10.62, β(SE) = 0.918(0.28), p < 0.01). It seems 
that being the last player to get the turn had an effect on choices. Presumably, 
as we hypothesized, the fact that the determination of final payoffs ultimately 
rests on C’s shoulders enhances C’s sense of responsibility and heightens the 
awareness of the externalities imposed upon A. Note also that the coefficient 
for the interaction term Treat x Role C is -0.625 (SE = 0.619), which is not 
significant. This means that role C players’ behavior, contrary to hypothesis 
4, did not differ between treatments. 
In a second analysis, we extended the analyses to incorporate the kindness 
attributions measured by the responses to the kindness scale.
4.4.2. Analysis of kindness attributions
In previous analyses we investigated role B and C behavior as a function of 
their role and treatment variations. In this section we report similar models 
incorporating the effect of kindness attributions, that is, how role B and C 
players perceived A’s kindness as stated in their responses to the kindness scale. 
Table 1. MCMC estimates of random intercept multilevel logistic regression coefficients for 
the interactions of treatment with a dummy variable for Role C player that takes the value of 
1 when the participant is assigned role C and 0 otherwise. We model the probability for the 
players to choose IN (IN = 1; OUT = 0). Reference category is role B player.
Empty model 
Coeff. (SE)
Model 1 
Coeff. (SE)
Model 2 
Coeff. (SE)
Model 3 
Coeff. (SE)
Final model 
Coeff. (SE)
Intercept 2.00 (0.337)* 1.694 (0.401)* 2.149 (0.467)* 2.331 (0.597)* 2.107 (0.531)*
Round 0.037 (0.022) 0.044 (0.023) 0.043 (0.024) 0.046 (0.024)
Role C -0.918(0.28)* -0.920 (0.288)* -0.709 (0.339)*
Treatment -0.373 (0.678) 0.035 (0.747)
Treat * Role C -0.625 (0.619)
Random Part
Level-2 Variance 4.200 (1.443) 4.783 (1.749)
ICC 0.56 0.60
Deviance 381.47 379.13 368.51 368.22 368.16
N. of obs. 545 545 545 545 545
*Absolute value of (Coefficient/S.E.) larger than 1.96. 
Source: Own elaboration.
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As a manipulation check, we first investigated whether kindness attributions 
were actually explained by other players’ actions. 
Indeed, participants’ actions largely explain kindness attributions. Tables 
A.1, A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A show the participants’ kindness attributions. 
In the case of B and C, Model 2 in Table A.1 and model 2 in Table A.2 show 
that the action of A largely improved the model fit (p < 0.001 in both cases). 
The same holds true for the actions of B. A likelihood ratio test comparing 
model 1 and 2 showed that including the variable for the kindness of B (as 
perceived by C) significantly increased the model fit (χ2 = 82.93, p < 0.001) 
(see Table A.3 in Appendix A). Thus, behavior affected kindness attributions, 
and IN choices were evaluated as “kinder” than OUT choices. The lesson we 
draw from these results is that the “kindness attribution” component of the 
intention-based argument of reciprocity seems to hold water. 
Naturally, we were mainly interested in the other component of the 
intention-based argument, that is, how perceptions of kindness influenced 
behavior in our experiment. We found that participants’ decisions were corre-
lated with how they perceived others’ actions in terms of their kindness. For 
the TT, we can analyze the extent to which A’s perceived kindness affected 
the behavior of role B and C players. Table 2 shows the degree to which B’s 
IN choices were influenced by A’s perceived kindness. We report random 
intercept models to analyze the effect of the perceived kindness of A on B’s 
action. In contrast to hypothesis 4, we found no evidence that the kinder A 
is perceived to be, the less likely B and C are to choose IN. Note that the coe-
fficient for the interaction of kindness of A and role B is 0.217 (SE = 0.59), 
which turned out to be non-significant (in Table 2). The coefficient for the 
interaction of kindness of A and role C is -0.29 (SE = 0.55) and also turned 
out to be non-significant.
Table 2. MCMC estimates of random intercept multilevel logistic regression coefficients of roles * 
kindness for A. The variable Kind A represents role C players’ evaluation of the kindness of role A 
subjects on a seven-point Likert-type scale. The action IN is our dependent variable.
Model 0 
Coefficient (SE)
Model 1 
Coefficient (SE)
Model 2 
Coefficient (SE)
Model 3 
Coefficient (SE)
Model 4 
Coefficient (SE)
Model 5 
Coefficient (SE)
Intercept 1.930 (0.584) 1.914 (0.546) 2.724 (0.735) -2.703 (2.28) -2.653 (2.518) -3.515 (3.574)
Round Center 0.011 (0.040) 0.009 (0.043) -0.023 (0.047) -0.016 (0.046) -0.021 (0.048)
Role C -1.375 (0.537)* -1.735 (0.581)* 0.110 (3.448)
Kind A 0.898 (0.364)* 0.901 (0.413)* 0.761 (0.547)
Role C * Kind A -0.294 (0.556)
Role B 0.413 (3.747)
Role B * Kind A 0.217 (0.598)
Deviance 131.117 131.998 124.545 120.165 120.470 120.783
Number of obs. 178 178 178 178 178 178
* Absolute value of (Coefficient/SE) larger than 2. 
Source: Own elaboration.
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We showed that C’s actions were not influenced by how they perceived 
others. Based on the intention-based argument of reciprocity theories, what 
we expected (hypothesis 4) is that the kindness of A, by choosing IN, would 
lower the likelihood of C choosing IN. Although the descriptive statistics sug-
gested this was the case, as role C players chose IN fewer times in the TT, the 
analysis proved that this difference is not statistically significant. Most of the 
time in the TT, when role A players chose IN, so did role B players. A possible 
explanation of why we did not find an effect may be due to the fact that C’s 
kindness judgments toward A and B may offset each other, which might make 
it difficult to gauge their influence relative to one another. Role C players 
may be torn between deciding in favor of A or in favor of B. Although we did 
not find a difference in B and C’s kindness evaluation of IN choices, we did 
find that perceived kindness of A is evaluated as less kind with round number. In 
our analyses, we took the kindness attributions each player made after being 
informed of the actions of each of the other participants as dependent variables 
(see Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix A). We estimated a normal 
response model using iterative generalized least squares models. In the first 
step, we took as a dependent variable how kind or unkind B and C found A in 
the TT. The model for the kindness attribution made by B of A’s actions rep-
resents an improvement with respect to the empty model (χ2 = 5.21, p = 0.02; 
see Model 1 in Table A.1). Note that the coefficient parameter for round 0.062 
(SE = 0.027) has a negative sign. Therefore, A is found to be progressively less 
kind by role B players. The same is true for Role C players (χ2 = 6.20, p = 0.02, 
see Model 1 in Table A.2).
Since subjects play the game repeatedly, the question remains whether they 
learn throughout the experiment. Note that levels of A’s kindness worsened 
with round number. This effect is brought about not only by role C players’ 
attributions, but also those of B players. It may be the case that with round 
number, cooperation between players B and C made A less optimistic about 
trusting. Consequently, fewer A players chose to pass the play to B, which in 
turn lowered A’s score on the kindness scale.
In a nutshell, the results confirm that there is no main effect of our mani-
pulation on the proportion of IN choices. However, C players chose to play 
IN fewer times. This suggests that being in charge of the final output (their 
role being pivotal) may enhance peoples’ sense of responsibility, and therefore 
induce them to refrain from behaving selfishly. In addition, the inclusion of a 
measurement of participants’ kindness attributions showed that their responses 
in the different experimental conditions are partly moderated by their kindness 
judgments. Thus, individual behavior seems responsive to the way participants 
consider others’ kindness.
5. Conclusion
The objective of this study was to evaluate if partners to a corrupt transac-
tion would refrain from infringing externalities on a third party that had 
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previously relied on them. With this goal in mind, we considered a three-
player corruption game in which players A could signal trust. In addition, 
we used a coarse measure of kindness (attributions) as a proxy of trust. We 
considered a three-player corruption game in which players A could signal 
fairness intentions. In addition, we measured kindness attributions using a 
scale. According to intention-based theories of reciprocity, we would have 
expected a lessening of corruption (e.g., fewer IN choices by B and C) in the 
Trust treatment relative to the baseline. However, our main contention, that 
the presence of an active player suffering from negative externalities would 
make players B and C refrain from corruption, thus stated, is not borne out 
by the data. The presence of a kind first player does not have a significant 
impact on the decisions of other players to cooperate or defect. This result 
seems to concur with the literature on experimental corruption (see Abbink 
et al., 2002; Barr and Serra, 2009) in that transaction partners hardly take 
into consideration harm done to others, but goes against the predictions of 
intention-based reciprocity models. Even more puzzling is the fact that second 
movers (players B) chose the self-maximizing option as they considered that 
A was kinder. The strong point of our study is that we do find that behavior 
affects kindness attributions, so “the first step in the mechanism” seems to 
work. However, these kindness attributions either do not affect behavior or 
affect it in an unexpected way.
Our results bring out some aspects of kindness-driven reciprocity that have 
not received much attention, and that require further scrutiny. For instance, 
passing on the play even when it invariably increases others’ earnings might 
not be the only element triggering a reciprocal response. An action may have 
other contextual features that could make its appraisal difficult in terms of 
kindness. As our study shows, being put in a moral dilemma or in a situation 
that enhances one’s responsibility may also be a factor modulating reciprocal 
responses. When they get their turn, C players bear a heavier burden than B 
players, since they are ultimately responsible for final payoffs. This is manifest 
in the fact that unlike B players’ selfish actions (which could be reversed by C 
choosing OUT), those of C players are not reversible. 
Contrary to claims made in previous studies (Abbink et al., 2002; Barr and 
Serra, 2009), which have stated that reciprocity is a main mechanism through 
which corruption is sustained, kindness attributions seem orthogonal to reci-
procation in our experiment, as implied by our data. Although subjects were 
not indifferent to the degree of kindness of the other players, their behavior 
does not support a reciprocity mechanism. This result points to the need to 
amend models of kindness-based reciprocity with more fine-grained utility 
functions that might take into consideration those aspects, such as pivotality or 
responsibility, which arose as key drivers of reciprocity (of the lack of it) in our 
study. To be sure, the lack of support for a reciprocity mechanism between first 
and second mover in our experiment does not preclude that this mechanism 
might have a stronger impact in a repeated environment. It seems possible that 
corruption may be sustained by reciprocity but as a sub-product of repeated 
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game incentives (see, for instance, Abbink et al., 2002), while corruption may 
be fueled by self-interest in one-shot scenarios. Another explanation for the 
lack of effect of a reciprocity mechanism between A and B could be that at 
least a fraction of subjects could have perceived A’s actions as strategically 
motivated, since by passing the play to B, A players’ behavior may be driven 
by the expectancy of higher payoffs. It has been shown in trust games that 
reciprocity is stronger when this type of strategic considerations can be ruled 
out (see Stanca et al., 2009). Future studies should attempt to rule out stra-
tegic considerations in order to disentangle the effect of kindness from other 
potential confounders. As in the study of Stanca et al., this could be achieved 
by manipulating the information sets of the players. 
In line with recent research (Gneezy et al., 2018), albeit in a different 
setting, our results also suggest that corruption is driven mainly by greed 
or self-interest. Gneezy et al. (2018) recently stated that it is important 
from a public policy perspective whether the main motivation for bribery is 
reciprocity or greed (in the sense of payoff-maximization) because if “greed 
drives bribery, policy interventions should focus on preventing bribes that 
are contingent on a certain outcome. On the other hand, if reciprocity moti-
vates bribery, policy interventions should focus on making reciprocity more 
difficult, for example, by decreasing personal contact through anonymity 
and staff rotation.” 
From the perspective of nudging away people from corrupt practices, our 
results seem to suggest that policy efforts should be directed towards enhan-
cing public officials’ awareness of their pivotality. One interesting avenue 
to explore is the use of normative “nudges” to prime prescribed/proscribed 
behaviors. It has been shown that focusing people’s attention on norms helps 
to tilt the balance towards pro-social behavior (Cialdini et al., 1990; Krupka 
and Weber, 2009). In the context of corruption, this may well be done by 
using a meaningful context (see Alekseev et al., 2017; Senci et al., 2019), by 
eliciting appropriate norms prior to game playing (see Krupka and Weber, 
2009) or by introducing explicit norms (see, for example, Karakostas and 
Zizzo, 2016). 
Our results also show that signaling kindness is not as straightforward as it 
may seem, and that other stronger motivations may play a counteracting role. 
Identifying the mechanisms responsible for corruption to emerge may be more 
intricate, because corruption could be the result of the aggregate working of 
multiple mechanisms. Nevertheless, the blatant contradictions between our 
results and what is hypothesized by social preferences theory in such a simple 
setting like ours is striking.
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Appendix A. Supplementary Results
Table A.1. MlwiN’s IGLS (Iterative generalized least squares) estimation of regression coeffi-
cients for the kindness judgments made by B toward A’s action
Dependent variable: kindness of A
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2
Intercept
4.500 
(0.191)
4.499 
(0.197)
2.520 
(0.149)
Round Center
-0.062 
(0.027)*
0.010 
(0.013)
Action A
3.689 
(0.154)*
Diff. in deviance 5.219 255.293
Random Part
Btw. subject variance
0.319 
(0.273)
0.396 
(0.287)
0.268 
(0.114)
Level-1 variance
4.361 
(0.495)
4.180 
(0.475)
0.938 
(0.107)
No. of obs. 180 180 180
Note: Difference in deviance in bold characters indicates that the model is an improvement over the pre-
vious model. * Indicates p < 0.05 (two-tailed test). 
Source: Own elaboration.
Corruption and externalities: Assessing the role of intentions Papers 2020, 105/1 131
Table A.2. MlwiN’s IGLS (iterative generalized least squares) estimation of regression coeffi-
cients. Kindness judgments made by C toward A is our dependent variable.
Dependent variable: kindness of A
Empty Model Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 4.527  
(0.165)
4.521 
(0.171)
2.421 
(0.135)
Round Center -0.071  
(0.028)*
-0.001 
 (0.011)
Action A 3.900  
(0.127)*
Diff. in deviance 6.208 317.862
Random Part
Btw. subject variance 0.009  
(0.208)
0.095 
(0.221)
0.266 
(0.101)
Level-1 variance 4.818  
(.548)
4.574  
(0.521)
0.657  
(0.075)
No. of obs. 180 180 180
Note: Difference in deviance in bold characters indicates that the model is an improvement over the pre-
vious model. * Indicates p < 0.05 (two-tailed test). 
Source: Own elaboration.
Table A.3. MlwiN’s IGLS (Iterative generalized least squares) coefficient estimates. Kindness 
judgments made by C toward B is our dependent variable.
Dependent variable: kindness of B
Empty Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 5.19 
(0.140)*
5.192 
(0.139)*
3.792 
(0.195)*
3.748 
(0.227)*
3.896 
(0.242)*
Round Center 0.002 
(0.012)
-0.004  
(0.010)
-0.004  
(0.010)
-0.002  
(0.010)
Action B 1.662 
(0.168)*
1.661 
(0.168)*
1.484
(0.200)*
Treatment 0.100  
(0.269)
-0.409 
(0.412)
Action B*Treat 0.606  
(0.376)
Diff. in deviance 0.022 82.931 0.139 2.558
Random Part
Btw. subject  variance 0.806  
(0.204)
0.808  
(0.204)
0.806  
(0.190)
0.805 
(0.190)
0.769  
(0.183)
Level-1 variance 1.277 
(0.117)
1.277  
(0.117)
0.919  
(0.084)
0.919  
(0.084)
0.917  
(0.084)
No. of obs. 296 296 296 296 296
Note: Difference in deviance in bold characters indicates that the model is an improvement over the pre-
vious model. * Indicates p < 0.05 (two-tailed test). 
Source: Own elaboration.
132 Papers 2020, 105/1 Carlos Maximiliano Senci
Appendix B. Instructions
1. Instructions for the No_Trust Treatment
Instructions
You are participating in a decision-making experiment. Please read the 
following instructions carefully. These instructions state everything you need 
to know to participate in the experiment.
If you have questions, please raise your hand. One of the experimenters 
will approach you to answer your questions.
In this experiment you will earn money: You will earn points during the 
experiment. The number of points that you earn depends on your own choi-
ces and the choices of other participants. The number of points others earn, 
depends on their own choices and your choice, as well. At the end of the 
experiment, the total number of points you earn during the experiment will 
be exchanged at an exchange rate of:
5 points = 10 euro cent 
The money you receive will be paid anonymously and in cash at the end 
of the experiment. The other participants will not learn what you receive and 
you will not learn what the others have received, either. Further instructions 
will follow on the next screens. 
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with other 
participants and you are not allowed to use your cell phones.
[Please click to continue.]
Overview of the experiment
In today’s experiment you can earn money. In every round of the experiment 
groups of three (3) participants are formed. The participants are labeled A, B 
and C. They will take turns. First participant B will make a decision. Then 
participant C. Participant A does not make any decision. Participants, when 
given their turn, choose between two actions: IN or OUT. At the end, all par-
ticipants are informed of the decisions made in his/her group and the points 
earned by each member. The instructions below explain the experiment in 
detail.
Formation of groups
At the beginning of each round of the experiment all participants will be 
randomly divided into groups of three (3) people. Note that groups change 
after every round.
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Assigning IDs
In each round, after the groups are formed, the computer randomly assigns 
an ID to each participant in a group. There will be 3 IDs: Participant A, Par-
ticipant B and Participant C. These IDs will also be reassigned in each round.
You will participate in 20 rounds of decision making and then you will be 
asked to answer a short questionnaire. 
[Please click to continue.]
Decisions
In every round, you will see a screen as shown below. You will find a graphic 
representation of the sequence of decisions that are made. As you can see in 
the figure, decisions are made sequentially: first participant B and then par-
ticipant C.
As shown in the figure, participant A cannot make decisions in the experi-
ment. Notice that the points are presented in the following order [Points for 
A, Points for B, Points for C]
Participant B chooses between actions IN or OUT. In case OUT is chosen 
the decision making ends and the points shown in the figure will be assigned to 
each participant. In case B chooses IN, participant C continues. Participant C 
chooses between IN or OUT, and the points are assigned as shown in the figure.
To better understand the points you can earn depending on your decisions 
and the decisions of the other participants, some examples are shown on the 
next screen.
[Please click to continue.]
Points
In every round, after the decision making is over, all the participants will see a 
screen as shown below. Three elements are displayed on the screen: a graphic 
representation of the decisions made (left), a table summarizing the choices of 
each participant and the points earned (right) and a box in which you have to 
answer a question. Notice that participants who were not given the chance to 
make a choice are represented in the table by a dash (-).
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To better understand the points you can earn in each situation, please look 
at the examples by clicking on the buttons below. Each example shows one of 
the four possible decision-making outcomes.
Once you have looked at the four examples, please click to continue.
Examples
Example 1 (B plays OUT)
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Example 2 (C plays IN)
Example 3 (C plays OUT)
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The instructions are over!
You will now start the decision making. Remember that:
— You will make decisions in 20 rounds.
— In each round new groups will be formed randomly
— In each round you will be randomly assigned a new ID: Participant A, B 
or C.
— At the top of the first screen you will see your ID for the current round.
— A screen summarizing all the decisions made and the points earned will be 
shown at the end of each round.
[Please click to continue.]
2. Instructions for the Trust_Treatment
Instructions
You are participating in a decision-making experiment. Please read the 
following instructions carefully. These instructions state everything you need 
to know to participate in the experiment.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. One of the experimenters 
will come to answer your questions.
In this experiment you will earn money: You will earn points during the 
experiment. The number of points that you earn depends on your own choi-
ces and the choices of other participants. The number of points others earn 
depends on their own choices and your choice as well. At the end of the 
experiment, the total number of points you earn during the experiment will 
be exchanged at an exchange rate of:
5 points = 10 cents
The money you receive will be paid anonymously and in cash at the end 
of the experiment. The other participants will not know what you receive and 
you will not know what the others have received either. Further instructions 
will follow on the next screens. 
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with the other 
participants and you are not allowed to use your cell phones.
[Please click to continue.]
Overview of the experiment
In today’s experiment you can earn money. In every round of the experiment 
groups of three (3) participants are formed. The participants are labeled A, B 
and C. They will take turns. First, participant A will make a decision. Then 
participant B. Then participant C. When given their turn, participants choose 
between two actions: IN or OUT. At the end, all participants are informed of 
the decisions made in his/her group and the points earned by each member. 
The instructions below explain the experiment in detail.
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Formation of groups
At the beginning of each round of the experiment all participants will be 
randomly divided into groups of three (3) people. Note that the groups change 
after every round.
Assigning IDs
In each round, after the groups are formed, the computer randomly assigns 
an ID to each participant in a group. There will be 3 IDs: Participant A, Par-
ticipant B and Participant C. These IDs will also be reassigned in each round.
You will participate in 20 decision-making rounds and then you will be 
asked to answer a short questionnaire. 
[Please click to continue.]
Decisions
In each round, you will see a screen as shown below. You will find a graphic 
representation of the sequence of decisions that are made. As you can see in 
the figure, decisions are made sequentially, starting with participant A, then 
B and then C.
As shown in the figure, Participant A can choose action IN or action OUT. 
If A chooses action OUT the decision making ends (B and C do not make a 
decision) and each participant will earn the points shown in the box below the 
OUT arrow in the image. Notice that the points are presented in the following 
order [Points for A, Points for B, Points for C]
If participant A chooses option IN, participant B will be allowed to conti-
nue the decision making. Participant B chooses between actions IN or OUT. 
In case OUT is chosen the decision making ends, and the points shown in the 
figure will be assigned to each participant. In case B chooses IN, participant 
C continues. Participant C chooses between IN or OUT, and the points are 
as illustrated in the graphic.
To better understand the points you can earn depending on the decisions 
you make and the decisions of the other participants, some examples are shown 
on the next screen.
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Figure for Decision Screen.
[Please click to continue.]
Points
In each round, after the decision making is over, all the participants will see a 
screen like the ones hown below. Three elements are displayed on the screen: 
a graphic representation of the decisions made (left), a table summarizing the 
choices of each participant and the points earned (right), and a box in which 
you have to answer a question. Notice that participants who were not given 
the chance to make a choice are represented in the table by a dash (-).
To better understand the points you can earn in each situation, please go 
through the examples by clicking on the buttons below. Each example shows 
one of the four possible decision-making outcomes.
Once you have looked at the four examples, please click to continue.
Figure for the Points screen.
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Examples
Example 1 (A plays OUT)
Example 2 (B plays OUT)
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Example 3 (C plays IN)
Example 4 (C plays OUT)
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The instructions are over!
You will now start the decision making. Remember that:
— You will make decisions in 20 rounds.
— In each round new groups will be formed randomly.
— In each round you will be randomly assigned a new ID: Participant A, B 
or C.
— At the top of the first screen you will see your ID for the current round.
— A screen summarizing all the decisions made and the points earned will be 
shown at the end of each round.
[Please click to continue.]
